



## ARTÍCULO

### Personal drivers behind the Brexit vote

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**Abstract:** The aim of this article is threefold. Firstly, by using the survey carried out in 2013 by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), we compare the voting intentions of the British prior to Brexit with the 2016 referendum results, and we show that these results were not a surprise. Secondly, we provide clear evidence for the correlation between the Brexit's results and protectionist preferences and opinions towards immigrants. Finally, we estimate probit and logit models that shed light on the impact of sociodemographic attributes on these preferences which are in line with the 2016 referendum results.

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**Resumen:** Este artículo tiene tres objetivos. En primer lugar, se muestra como los resultados del referéndum realizado en Gran Bretaña en 2016 no son sorprendentes dado que están en línea con los resultados obtenidos en la encuesta realizada en 2013 por el International Social Survey Program (ISSP). En Segundo lugar, se provee evidencia clara sobre la correlación existente entre los resultados del referéndum y las preferencias proteccionistas y las opiniones sobre los inmigrantes. Finalmente, se estiman modelos probit y logit que brindan información sobre el impacto de los atributos sociodemográficos en estas preferencias los cuales están en línea con los resultados obtenidos en el referéndum de 2016.

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## 1. Britain's Relations with the European Community and the European Union since 1945

After the Second World War, most European countries aim of securing lasting peace. The first step was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) through a Treaty that had six founding countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Each country agreed to run their heavy industries (coal and steel) under a common management. Given its success, member countries aimed at expanding cooperation to other sectors and, in 1957, they signed the Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic Community (EEC) and introduced the free movement of people, goods and services. It is worth mentioning that UK was not part of this process even when it was invited to join (Ellison, 2016).

In parallel, in 1960, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom looked for an alternative and they established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) through the Stockholm Convention. In 1973, the UK ceased to be a member of the EFTA and it decided to join the EEC.

However, in 1975, there was a referendum because the Labour Party had promised (in 1974) that the citizenship would decide whether to remain or not in the EEC. At that moment, 67% of the voters was in favor of being a member, although several political leaders argued that the agreement should be renegotiated (Cook and Francis, 1979).

In 1992, the members of the EEC signed a new agreement, the Maastricht Treaty that created the Euro and aimed at preparing the bloc for the European Monetary Union and it also included elements of a political union (citizenship, common foreign and internal affairs policy). The members looked for expanding the bloc beyond economic matters and the name was changed to European Community and the cooperation among them, was deepened by including two new pillars: common foreign and security policy and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.

The sole exemption was UK, the Maastricht Treaty included protocols on the UK that gave them opt-outs with the right to decide if and when they would join the Euro zone. Moreover, UK also received opt-outs from implementing the Schengen acquis (Cuel, 2017).

According to Startin (2015), UK citizens did not share a clear European identity with other EU members and this issue became a relevant psychological obstacle to pro-European British attitudes. Moreover, McLaren (2015) highlighted that, through its history, the public considered that the European integration has limited their sovereignty and the capacity of the government to take decisions such as an example, the capacity of the governments to control immigration.

The discussions among hard Eurosceptics, pro-Europeanists and soft Eurosceptics resulted in the referendum that took place in 2016. The former group was in favor of abandoning the European Union (EU) while the others were in favor of being a member. After a strong campaign in which issues such as immigration, terrorism, sovereignty and national identity had a key role, 52% voted to leave and 48% voted to remain in the EU. The Brexit process started in March 2017, when the government formally announced the country's withdrawal and it was ended on 31st January 2020. Until 31st

December 2020, the UK and the EU will renegotiate their future relationship. During this period, the UK remains subject to the EU law, part of the EU customs union and single market but UK is no longer part of the EU's political bodies or institutions (European Commission, 2020).

## 2. The referendum as a key instrument

The outcome of the referendums in general and the Brexit in particular, have generated a vast literature of their own. When elections are close and, at the same time, the EU is unpopular, Prosser (2016) showed that EU member states are very likely to call referendums to ratify EU treaties. A key issue has been identifying a person's main decision-making drivers when voting and the impacts on the integration process. It is especially true in cases such as the Brexit, in which several studies showed that the economic impacts would be negative given that it would lead to new trade barriers between the United Kingdom and not only the EU members but also with all countries that had a trade agreement with the EU (see for example, Sampson (2017)).

The Treaty of Nice could be set as an example of the importance of the referendums. It was related to the enlargement of the European Union (from 15 to 25 members). In all members this Treaty was ratified by the Parliament, Ireland was the exemption where all changes that imply a transfer of sovereignty to the EU require a constitutional amendment and the Constitution can only be amended by a referendum. In 2001, voters rejected the Treaty of Nice and after some changes, a second referendum took place in 2002 and 63% voted in favor of the Treaty. Garry, *et al.*, (2005) assessed these referendums held in Ireland and they showed that relevant issues related to the EU were the main drivers that shape the decision when voting rather than domestic political aspects. In that sense, they argued that the campaign played a relevant role regarding the provided information about the EU.

During the last decades, the referendums have often been used by the members. The consultations have sought views on several issues, including the enlargements or the Euro. Even when a referendum is a national consultation, the outcomes have direct impacts on the integration process and on many occasions the treaties were renegotiated.

Therefore, the understanding of the decision-making process at the individual level and appropriately dimensioning the results of the referendums are key issues for Brussels. It is especially true in the case of the Brexit. The European Commission is likely to adjust the priorities defined for the period 2019-2024, in order to avoid disagreements among the members which may try to block its proposals or even question their membership to the bloc. The cohesion and the strengthening of the European identity are key issues at this moment.

Moreover, another crucial driver is the Euroscepticism, a phenomenon that is becoming increasingly influential. As Brack and Startin (2015) pointed out it is supported by political parties, non-party groups and within the media. These changes have transformed it from the margins to a main issue that is challenging and questioning the EU's scope of intervention and its legitimacy. In that sense, Van Elsas, *et al.*, (2006) assessed the profiles of the Eurosceptics in the 15 western states of the European Union. The authors highlighted that both, left-wing parties and right-wing

parties, have made similar criticism to the EU that have been harder in the case of extreme right-wings and extreme leftwing factions which have gained seats at the parliaments. Given these facts, more referendums like the Brexit could not be discarded and it is especially sensitive in the case of relevant members such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

In line with this, Evans (2000) added that left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptics had claims against the EU which are markedly different. While the right-wing tend to focus on cultural issues (such as migration and national identity), those on the left-wing tend to concentrate on the economic sphere (such as redistributive policies and the role of government in the economy). Kriesi, *et al.*, (2008), argued that although Euroscepticism is a multidimensional phenomenon, the cultural components were the most relevant the fundamentals followed by the economic issues.

### 3. Data source

The microdata comes from the National Identity module of the 2013 survey carried out by ISSP. The survey asks respondents about their opinions on a great variety of issues, including trade preferences, immigration, patriotism, and politics, as well as demographic and socio-economic information such as age, gender, education, religion, religiosity, political party affiliation and others.

More than 900 people have answered the survey in Great Britain (North Ireland is not included) and the question that allow us to identify people preferences towards EU membership is:

“If there were a referendum today to decide whether Britain does or does not remain a member of the European Union, how would you vote?”

There were three possible answers:

- Vote for Britain to remain a member of the European Union.
- Vote for Britain to leave the European Union.
- Cannot choose.

Table 3. Independent variables

	Label	Values	
Personal attributes	AGE	Respondent's age.	54
	ATHEIST	1 if being atheist and 0 in other case.	0.48
	CHAUVINISM	1 if preferring to be a citizen of Great Britain than of any other country in the world and 0 in other case.	0.37
	CONSERVATIVE_PARTY	1 if identifying with the Conservative Party and 0 in other case.	0.30
	DIVORCED	1 if being divorced and 0 in other case.	0.17
	EDUYRS	Years of schooling.	13
	INCOME	1 if personal income is £ 1.600 or more and 0 in other case.	0.32
	LABOUR_PARTY	1 if identifying with the labour Party and 0 in other case.	0.27
	MEN	1 if being a man and 0 in other case.	0.48
	NATIONALISM	1 if feeling close to Great Britain and 0 in other case.	0.24
	PATRIOTISM	1 if being proud of Great Britain and 0 in other case.	0.54
	RELIGIOSITY	1 if attending religious services at least once a week and 0 in other case.	0.20
	UNEMPLOYED	1 if being unemployed and 0 in other case.	0.46
	WIDOWED	1 if being widowed and 0 in other case.	0.11
	Regions	ENGLAND	1 if living in England and 0 in other case.
WALES		1 if living in Wales and 0 in other case.	0.05
SCOTLAND		1 if living in Scotland and 0 in other case (omitted variable).	0.09

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013.

Table 1. Preferences about EU membership

	EU_MEMBERSHIP
Vote for Britain to remain a member of the EU	36.6%
Cannot choose	23.7%
Vote for Britain to leave the EU	39.7%
Total	100%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013.

As Table 1 showed, 39.7% of respondents preferred to leave the EU while 36.6% would choose to remain while 23.7% could not choose. Even when the results of this survey are very close to the referendum results, those who could not choose are key players when explaining the differences between the survey results and the referendum results. From 2013 to 2016, in most of the cases, the opinions could be shaped later by interest groups and the electoral campaign, among other drivers.

Given this dataset, when estimating the model, we focus on the group of people who had an opinion and compare the responses to this question (in 2013) with the (2016) referendum results. Secondly, we focus on determining which elements shape people's preferences. For doing so, we generate the binomial variable EU\_MEMBERSHIP:

EU\_MEMBERSHIP = 0 if respondent would vote to remain  
1 if respondent would vote to leave

Table 2. Distribution of answers

	EU_MEMBERSHIP
0 - Vote for Britain to remain a member of the EU	48.0%
1 - Vote for Britain to leave the EU	52.0%
Total	100%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013.

The table 3 presents the set of independent variables that are included and the median values.

#### 4. Methodology

Firstly, with the goal of deepening the understanding of the links among a set of variables related to the globalization process, we compute the Spearman's correlation coefficient (because we deal with ordinal data). The correlation is a measure of an association between variables. If they are correlated, the changes in one variable are associated with changes in the other variable. The Spearman's correlation coefficient,  $\rho$ , ranks from -1 to 1 and the results are interpreted as follows:

- If  $\rho = -1$ , there is a perfect negative association.
- If  $-1 < \rho < 0$ , there is an unperfect negative association.
- If  $\rho = 0$ , there is no association.
- If  $0 < \rho < 1$ , there is an unperfect positive association.
- Si  $\rho = 1$ , there is a perfect positive association.

Secondly, to strengthen previous results, we employ principal components analysis (PCA). This technique explains the total variability of a set of  $m$  correlated variables using  $m$  orthogonal principal components. They are new variables that are weighted linear combinations of the original variables. The components are uncorrelated and most of the information is stored into the first components (see Jolliffe (1990) for detailed exposition). For doing so, we normalize the data so that PCA works properly.

Thirdly, we generate a binomial variable, EU\_MEMBERSHIP, it is a binomial variable and as Ameniya (1981) describes the probability of being equal to one is:

$$P(EU\_MEMBERSHIP = 1) = \Phi(\beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_n x_n)$$

Where:  $\beta_i$  are unknown parameters,  $x_i$  are the independent variables and  $\Phi$  is the standard normal distribution function. Instead of  $\Phi$ , the logistic distribution,  $L(x)$ , could be used. If it is the case, a logit model would be estimated where:

$$L(x) = [1 + \exp(-x)]^{-1}$$

Ameniya (1981) argues that the logistic function is a good approximation to the normal distribution and that the estimated parameters obtained by using the two distributions are often very close (the multiplicative factors are the exceptions). For additional information about these models see Berkson (1955), Cox (1966), Domencich and McFadden, (1975), Finney (1971) and McFadden (1974).

A probit or logit model provides the probability that the dependent variable equals one as a function of the independent variables (at the mean). Moreover, when considering these models, the estimated parameters ( $\beta_i$ ) do not provide direct information on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Relevant conclusions are drawn from the marginal effects of each independent variable when one of them equals one and the others at means. For example, the marginal effect of an independent variable is:

$$\frac{\partial \Phi(v)}{\partial (x_i)} = \beta_i \Phi'(v)$$

#### 5. Why the surprise over the 2016 referendum results?

Before the referendum, opinion polls tended to show very similar ratios in favor of remaining and leaving. Even when the difference was minimal, most of the polls showed that remaining as an EU member would prevail. However, three years before, the ISSP survey's results were clearly in line with the referendum results.

Keeping in mind that 23.7% of the respondents could not choose (Table 1). If this group is excluded, results showed that among those who had an opinion, 52% would vote to leave the EU and 48% would vote for continuing to be a member. We highlighted that these ratios are the same that were observed in June 2016, when the referendum took place with a huge turnout of 72.2%.

Table 4. Comparison between the ISSP results and the referendum results

	Leave	Remain
Referendum results (2016)	51.9%	48.1%
ISSP results (2013)	52.0%	48.0%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013 and The Electoral Commission.

Table 5 presents the distribution of answers by region, the option "leave" won in England and Wales while in Scotland and Northern Ireland, "remain" prevails. In London, the voter turnout was 69.6%, among this group of people who voted in the referendum, 59.9% opted to remain as a member. We highlighted that the ISSP survey showed the same tendencies.

Table 5. People's preferences by region

Region	Moment	Leave	Remain
England	Referendum (2016)	53.4%	46.6%
	ISSP (2013)	53.0%	47.0%
Scotland	Referendum (2016)	38.0%	62.0%
	ISSP (2013)	38.2%	61.8%
Wales	Referendum (2016)	52.5%	47.5%
	ISSP (2013)	60.7%	39.3%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013 and BBC.

In the case of age, the results are also very similar. Table 6 shows that young people tend to prefer to remain as a member while older people are more likely to support Brexit.

Table 6. Preferences for EU membership and age

Age group	Moment	Leave	Remain
18-24	Referendum (2016)	27%	73%
	ISSP (2013)	39.1%	60.9%
25-34	Referendum (2016)	38%	62%
	ISSP (2013)	42.3%	57.7%
35-44	Referendum (2016)	48%	52%
	ISSP (2013)	46.9%	53.1%
45-54	Referendum (2016)	56%	44%
	ISSP (2013)	47.6%	52.4%
55-64	Referendum (2016)	57%	43%
	ISSP (2013)	55.6%	44.4%
65 or older	Referendum (2016)	60%	40%
	ISSP (2013)	61.0%	39.0%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013 and BBC.

Regarding gender, table 7 reveals dissimilar results. While most of the men support Brexit when answering the ISSP survey and when the referendum took place, in the case of women, the results does not coincide. It is worth noting that when the ISSP survey was carried out, 28.6% of the women indicated that they could not choose. So, the figures indicated that, most of these women decided to vote in favor of leaving the EU.

Table 7. Preferences for EU membership and gender

Gender	Moment	Leave	Remain
Women	Referendum (2016)	49.0%	51.0%
	ISSP (2013)	52.2%	47.8%
Men	Referendum (2016)	55.0%	45.0%
	ISSP (2013)	51.8%	48.2%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013 and Statista.

The educational level is also relevant when assessing these preferences and, once again, the results are very close. As Table 8 shows, in both cases, more educated people are more likely to support the remain option while the opposite is true in the case of less educated people.

Table 8. Preferences for EU membership and the educational level

Category	Moment	Leave	Remain
No secondary qualification	Referendum (2016)	65%	35%
	ISSP (2013)	77.1%	22.9%
(General) Certificate of Secondary Education or equivalent	Referendum (2016)	54%	46%
	ISSP (2013)	60.0%	40%
O-level or A-level or equivalent	Referendum (2016)	56%	44%
	ISSP (2013)	56.1%	43.9%
Higher below degree level	Referendum (2016)	45%	55%
	ISSP (2013)	51.5%	48.5%
University degree	Referendum (2016)	26%	74%
	ISSP (2013)	26.9%	73.1%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013 and Statista.

People’s attributes play a key role in shaping this kind of opinions and the same is true in the case of political affiliation. In this case, the survey results are also full in line with the referendum results (Table 9). We present the three biggest parties, and it is found that those who identify with the Conservative Party are more likely to vote to “leave” while the opposite is true for those who identify with the Labour Party or with the Liberal Democrats.

Table 9. Preferences for EU membership and political preferences

Political Party	Moment	Leave	Remain
Conservative	Referendum (2016)	58%	42%
	ISSP (2013)	62.0%	38.0%
Labour	Referendum (2016)	37%	63%
	ISSP (2013)	39.9%	60.1%
Liberal Democrats	Referendum (2016)	30%	70%
	ISSP (2013)	37.9%	62.1%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013 and Statista.

Table 10. Preferences for EU membership and opinions towards protectionism and immigrants

		If there were a referendum today to decide whether Britain does or does not remain a member of the European Union, how would you vote?			Total
		Vote for Britain to remain a member of the EU	Can't choose	Vote for Britain to leave the EU	
Great Britain should limit the imports of foreign products?	Disagree or strongly disagree	12.0%	4.5%	5.8%	22.3%
	Neither agree or disagree	11.0%	8.5%	8.7%	28.2%
	Agree or strongly agree	13.6%	10.8%	25.2%	49.6%
	Total	36.6%	23.7%	39.7%	100%
Immigrants take jobs away from people born in GB	Disagree or strongly disagree	12.9%	4.7%	5.8%	23.4%
	Neither agree or disagree	11.1%	6.4%	7.7%	25.2%
	Agree or strongly agree	12.5%	12.5%	26.2%	51.3%
	Total	36.6%	23.7%	39.7%	100%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013.

## 6. Protectionism, immigrants, the benefits from the European Union and the Brexit results

Great Britain has a long tradition of protectionism since its creation in 1707 and even when during its history there were relevant changes towards free trade, the pendulum continues to swing back. People opted to abandon the EU and there is uncertainty about the impacts of this decision and about the foreign policy that the country would follow. Even when the country may benefit from free-trade or by signing trade agreements, some citizens who are, at the same time, the voters, demand a different set of policies which justified the never-ending protectionist spiral.

In this section, we assess the linkages between the opinions towards the EU membership and the opinions towards protectionism and immigrants. It is worth mentioning that in this section, we consider the whole sample because at least one of these categories “cannot choose”, “neither agree or disagree” or “do not know” appears as a possible answer to all questions. In order to shed light on these issues, we consider two additional questions which collect information about these two processes:

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1. Britain should limit the imports of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

2. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain.

In both cases, the answers were codified in three categories:

- Strongly agree or agree.
- Neither agree nor disagree.
- Disagree or strongly disagree.

Table 10 shows the joint distribution of answers and it is worth highlighting that most of the British agree with both these statements. Moreover, we point out that 25.2% of the British would opt to leave the EU and, at the same time, they prefer protectionism. Additionally, 26.2% of the British would opt to leave the EU and, at the same time, they consider that immigrants are a threat because they take jobs away.

By using STATA, we find not only that the opinions are correlated but also that the correlations are significant at 1%. Firstly, we consider the opinions towards EU membership and preferences towards protectionism (PROTECT) and the test shows that  $p$  equals 0.25. Secondly, when we compare the opinions towards EU membership and the opinions towards immigrants (IMMIGRANTS), the test indicates that  $p$  equals 0.28. Finally, when considering the benefits from the bloc (BENEFITS), the relationship seems to be stronger,  $p$  equals 0.64.

These figures are clear evidence that the British have a clear

anti-globalization sentiment that may explain the 2016 referendum results. The question that inevitably emerges from these results is: what are the drivers of these personal opinions? The next section deals with them.

It is worth highlighting that British's perception about the EU makes matters worse. Table 11 shows that only 17.9% of respondents indicate that Great Britain has greatly or largely benefited from being a member and most of these people would opt to remain a member. It also reveals that most of the people considers that the bloc has not benefit the country or that the benefits were scarce and hence, they are more likely to vote to abandon the bloc.

Table 11. Preferences for EU membership and individual perceptions about the benefits from being a member

		If there were a referendum today to decide whether Britain does or does not remain a member of the European Union, how would you vote?			
		Vote for Britain to remain a member of the EU	Can't choose	Vote for Britain to leave the EU	Total
Great Britain benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the EU	Greatly benefits / largely benefits	16.1%	1.1%	0.7%	17.9%
	Somewhat benefits	15.6%	8.7%	7.0%	31.3%
	Do not know	1.9%	6.6%	2.7%	11.1%
	Does not benefit at all or only a little	3.6%	7.2%	28.9%	39.7%
	Total	37.1%	23.5%	39.4%	100%

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013.

With the aim of measuring the commonality between these variables, the PCA methodology was applied. Table 12 shows the eigenvalues from highest to lowest. The eigenvalues are the variances of the principal components. By ranking the eigenvectors in order of their eigenvalues, highest to lowest, the principal components are ordered according to their significance.

The results show that the first principal component has a variance of 1.9 which explains 43% ( $0.43 = 1.9/4$ ) of the total variance. If the first and the second components are considered, 71% of the total variance is explained. It is worth noting that all components have a contribution that is higher than 10% so there is no need to reduce the number of components. In this case, this process would lead to losing relevant information.

Table 12. Principal components analysis results

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Component1	1.90	0.97	0.48	0.48
Component2	0.93	0.24	0.23	0.71
Component3	0.69	0.22	0.17	0.88
Component4	0.47		0.12	1.00

Number of observations: 781

Number of components: 4

Trace: 4

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013.

Finally, these figures show that several drivers shape people preferences about this issue. On one extreme, there are people who recognize that Great Britain had largely benefit from being a member and at the same time, they prefer to leave the EU. On the other extreme, there are people who perceived that the country had not benefit from being a member and, at the same time, they would vote to remain a member. These drivers are personal attributes such as gender, educational attainment, political views or feelings of nationalism, among others. The goal of the next section is to present a model which provides evidence on the role of these variables in shaping people's opinions.

## 7. Key drivers of British's opinion on the Brexit

In order to shed light on the personal characteristics that shape individual's decision about the EU's membership, by using STATA, and following Ameniya (1981), we estimate two probit models and two logit models and we compute the marginal effects that are the impacts on the probability of voting to leave the bloc.

As Table 13 shows and in line with previous findings, the probability of preferring to leave the EU is 52%. It is worth remembering that in the case of these models we reduce the sample. Only those who expressed a positive or a negative opinion are considered because we aim at comparing the estimation results with the referendum results.

Table 13. Impacts on the probability of voting to leave the EU (marginal effects after probit and logit model estimations)

	1 - Probit		2 - Logit models	
	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 2.1	Model 2.2
	Personal attributes	Personal attributes plus region	Personal attributes	Personal attributes plus region
AGE	0.004 (0.001)***	0.003 (0.001)***	0.004 (0.001)***	0.003 (0.001)***
INCOME_SCALE	-0.053 (0.032)*	-0.048 (0.030)*	-0.082 (0.045)*	-0.081 (0.043)*
EDUCATION	-0.023 (0.055)***	-0.034 (0.007)***	-0.022 (0.054)***	-0.034 (0.007)***
UNEMPLOYED	0.076 (0.038)**	0.090 (0.037)**	0.078 (0.040)**	0.097 (0.038)**
CONSERVATIVE_PARTY	0.107 (0.025)***	0.096 (0.029)***	0.108 (0.024)***	0.102 (0.029)***
LABOUR_PARTY	-0.135 (0.086)	-0.140 (0.088)	-0.134 (0.085)	-0.145 (0.092)
PATRIOTISM	-0.089 (0.071)	-0.070 (0.074)	-0.091 (0.071)	-0.081 (0.080)
NATIONALISM	0.106 (0.036)***	0.092 (0.038)**	0.108 (0.034)***	0.097 (0.038)**
CHAUVINISM	0.116 (0.047)**	0.097 (0.050)**	0.113 (0.044)***	0.097 (0.048)**
MEN	0.050 (0.034)	0.046 (0.033)	0.064 (0.041)	0.047 (0.035)
DIVORCED	0.046 (0.032)	0.040 (0.033)	0.047 (0.032)	0.038 (0.033)
WIDOWED	0.046 (0.087)	-0.039 (0.088)	0.047 (0.086)	-0.038 (0.094)
ATHEIST	-0.004 (0.058)	-0.026 (0.065)	-0.002 (0.058)	-0.027 (0.071)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.141 (0.067)**	-0.142 (0.068)**	-0.142 (0.067)**	-0.153 (0.070)**
ENGLAND		0.239 (0.085)**		0.243 (0.097)**
WALES		0.350 (0.074)***		0.336 (0.075)***
N	596	596	596	596
Prob(vote_ag=1) =	51.92%	51.62%	51.98%	51.70%

Notes: \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Robust standard errors in brackets.

Source: own elaboration based on ISSP 2013.

There is a vast body of literature that shows the different attitudes that winners and losers of globalization have towards issues such as international trade, immigration, cooperation, and the European integration (Teney *et al.*, 2014, Kriesi *et al.*, 2012, Azmanova, 2011 and Tucker *et al.*, 2002). In line with this, our findings indicate that older people, poorer people, and less educated people are more likely to favor leaving the EU. Hobolt (2016) showed similar results, but it is worth remembering that this survey was carried out three years before the Brexit referendum. Moreover, we extend her findings by considering unemployment as a key driver. Figures show that those who are unemployed tend to favor leaving the EU. The same is true in the case of those who support protectionist policies and those who are against immigration, these elements are key drivers that shape people's attitudes towards the Brexit (see also Hobolt and Tilley, 2016 and Kriesi *et al.*, 2012).

The figures also show that political affiliation matter in the expected direction. As proof, the models shows that people who identify with the Conservative Party are much more

likely to favor the leaving option while there is no significant difference between those who affiliates to the Labour party and those who affiliates to the Liberal Democrats Party. It is worth remembering that according to the ISSP's survey results, most of these voters preferred to remain in the EU and both parties showed similar ratios (Table 9).

Findings also show that attachment to the country plays a relevant role in shaping this opinion. It is worth noting that there are different degrees of attachment to one's country which could be divided into different categories such as patriotism, nationalism, and chauvinism. While national pride and patriotism coexist, nationalism goes far beyond national pride. In consequence, feelings such as national pride and cosmopolitanism are not contradictory, whereas nationalism and cosmopolitanism are contradictory. In the case of those who consider that their country is better than other countries, the probability of supporting country's isolation is higher (Smith and Kim, 2006, Mayda and Rodrik, 2005 and Carey, 2002).

Regarding the British, being proud of the country does not make a significant difference while feelings such as nationalism and chauvinism do it. It is worth highlighting that the impact of chauvinism on the probability of voting to leave is larger than the impact of nationalism. These feelings shape people's (negative) attitudes towards other cultures or ethnic groups and they are an obstacle to the European identity.

When controlling for other personal attributes, the models provide interesting new evidence on the Brexit. Firstly, findings indicate that there are no significant differences between women and men. According to the survey's results, most of the men and most women preferred to leave the bloc and the ratios were very similar (Table 7). The Brexit campaign seems to be a larger impact on women because, in 2016, most of them voted to remain as a member. Secondly, it is shown that marital status does not play a role in shaping this opinion. Finally, even when there are no significant differences among religious groups and atheist, religiosity matters and in the expected direction. Those who attend to religious services, at least once a month, are less likely to support to leave the EU. It is accepted that these people could be more tolerant with "others" and are more likely to accept foreign products or immigrants (Hobolt *et al.*, 2011 and Mayda and Rodrik, 2005).

Finally, model two controls for the place of residence which emerges as a key driver that shapes people's decision. Findings show that those who live in England and in Wales are more likely to prefer to abandon the EU than those who live in Scotland. The same pattern held for the 2016 referendum. It is worth remembering that London was an exception in England, the most cosmopolitan city voted in favor to remain as a member. This characteristic could be related to its role as a world financial centre, to the fact that London is one of the world's leading tourism destinations, to its the flows of foreign direct investments from other EU's countries that the city has received or the share of London's total service exports to other EU's members.

## 8. Conclusions

A clear conclusion that emerges is that the campaign was not a relevant determinant of people's decision. This is true because the 2013 ISSP's results are very close to the 2016 referendum results. This is a key contribution because it was said that the campaign was dishonest and that dirty tactics were used and even when it could be true, it did not impact on personal attitudes.

Additionally, we present econometric evidence that verify previous findings. Being older, poorer people, less educated people and being unemployed are key drivers that raise the probability of voting to leave the EU. These groups could be linked to the losers of the globalization process, those who see immigrants of imports as a threat.

In line with previous literature on political preferences, the models provide clear evidence on the role of the preferred political party and in line with the party's preferences, the Conservative Party supporters are more likely to opt to leave the bloc. This fact could be related to the relationship between Great Britain and the EU, specially, since the M. Thatcher's neo-liberal economic strategy. Her Euroscepticism was the key element for the creation of the Eurosceptic movement that some decades later emerged stronger and elements such as the immigration and its

impacts on the labor market and on the crime rates were highlighted during the Brexit campaign.

Moreover, regarding nationalism and chauvinism, a clear contribution of this research is to show that the debate on the European integration process is not exclusively linked to the single market but also to the erosion of sovereignty which is related to government capacity to take decisions regarding trade and immigration, among other issues.

The Brexit process leads to a divided country, not only along age, education or income level, but also in terms of geography. The place of residence is a relevant driver and those who live in England and Wales are much more likely to prefer to leave the EU.

Probit and logit models show very similar results that is a clear proof of the robustness of our results. These findings shed light on the need for further research that aims at identifying winners and losers of the globalization by considering the evolution of for example, wages and unemployment in each region.

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